

INDIA-CHINA COMPETITION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION

Author: **Sarvat Soaliha**

Doctoral Research Scholar, Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University,
Uttar Pradesh, India

ABSTRACT

China's rise as a significant economic superpower over the last several decades has been accompanied by an increase in its global footprint. In the marine domain, China is actively contesting with both regional and global powers for access, creating the network called as Chinese 'string of pearls.' In spite of China's repeated claims that its actions are peaceful and aimed at safeguarding SLOC, commerce, trade, and energy security for the country, not many in the regional and global community seem convinced. China's desire for better access and presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) over the past two decades has sparked a lot of concern and discomfort in both India and the US. The purpose of this article is to examine China's operations and strategic goals in the IOR. This study intends to provide an outline of the strategic interests of both India as well as China in the Indian Ocean region (IOR).

Keywords: Indian Ocean Region, Security, Strategy, Implications

INTRODUCTION

The Indian Ocean is the 3rd largest water body on the earth, with 34 coastal states. It is also important to note that much of the world's oil traverses through the Indian Ocean on its way to and from the littoral states via critical Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs). Despite its importance, in the past the 'Great Powers' have paid relatively little attention to this region as notably evident in the period of Cold War, when exercises, confrontation, and trade occurred in the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean. However, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) began to gain importance as the dynamics of global politics began to alter. It is now a crucial component of global power dynamics. Previously, the IOR was well-known for its choke points and oil trade routes and, such as the straits of Malacca and Hormuz. Despite the fact that oil trade routes are still relevant, major international powers like the United States are striving to control the IOR with the support of their key allies in the region. Here, it is important to note that both India and China strive not only to maintain a strong grip, but also to establish their regional hegemony. To achieve this goal, they are forming ties in the region with countries which can lend a hand if needed. The purpose of this paper is to examine the increasing competition between India and China in the IOR.

THEORETICAL REVIEW

The India-China relationship in the IOR incorporates elements of the three most influential international relations theories: realism, liberalism, and constructivism.

Realism

Realism holds that states are the primary actors in international affairs and that there is no greater authority that governs them (anarchy)ⁱ. When it comes to international affairs, states are the key players. There is a lot of competition for market dominance and security in an anarchic system like this. Competition is considered as a zero-sum game in which the interest of a state is dependent on the loss of other state. Survival is the main goal of all states in this situationⁱⁱ. China, in this context, is trying to encircle and isolate India in the IOR by building closer strategic ties with the countries in the region.

Liberalism

Liberals believe that human beings are rational beings, and this rationality may be used to foster greater cooperation among nations. The basic argument of Liberals is that in a time globalization and free trade, states have been pushed into a complicated system of economic interdependence in which the material costs of conflicts somewhat exceed the potential gains. As a result, the state would not opt for war. From the liberal perspective, the relations between India and China would be cooperative and peaceful.

Constructivism

Constructivists, on the other hand, believe that ideas are always important. As an example, the international security and defense is not just a collection of tangible assets like territories, peoples, and weapons, but also a collection of concepts and understandings that guide the way such assets are created, structured, and implemented. As a result, while the physical components are present, the intellectual component, which organizes and guides them, takes precedence. Constructivists believe that the initial disagreements between China and India produced a climate of distrust and antagonism. The recurring crises emerging from their various conflicting problems kept this idea intact and strengthened it. The emergence of India and China in the same geographical area has worsened the problem even further. ⁱⁱⁱ

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This research work has made use of historical, analytical, descriptive, discourse analysis and comparative methods. To study Sino-India growing competition in the IOR, this study uses comparative method as it primarily deals with current developments. The study is based on primary and secondary sources and is analytical in nature. The researcher has made use of official reports, news articles, research papers and various other books on the subject, to carry out this work.

IMPORTANCE OF THE INDIAN OCEAN

Due to the IOR's size and geographic position, it has a significant political presence on a global level. The IOR, which stretches from the east coast of Africa to Australia's western coast, is host to some of the most vital naval key points in the world^{iv}. Besides its location, the IOR is the center of global oil trade. Energy trade routes, which link China's Eastern coast to the Strait of Malacca, illustrate the quantity of oil that is transported regularly in the waters of the IOR and meet energy demands of China^v. The Indian Ocean Region borders India, Pakistan, The Islamic Republic of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and 5 member states of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)^{vi}. This demonstrates its geopolitical importance. As a result, the littoral regions are highly reliant on the IOR for trade. The Indian Ocean Region represents the future of global politics

CHINA-INDIA RIVALRY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR), a key geostrategic space linking the energy-rich nations of the Middle East with economically vibrant Asia, is the site of intensifying rivalry between China and India. Powerful military and economic growth in China has been accompanied by major military modernisation, enhancing China's overall capacity. The increasing naval capacity of China, which includes abilities against submarines—its steadily developing expertise in domains including anti-ship missiles, new surface ships, undersea activities and extended range arrangements, has important ramifications for India^{vii}. It has been a long time since the United States tried to support the expansion of Indian influence. India has been bolstered as a counterweight against China by the US on the basis that both India and Washington are interested in preventing China's predominance in the region^{viii}.

Many observers believe that China is stepping up its efforts to increase its influence and threaten the West, India, as well as a rule-based global order, notably in the Indo-Pacific area. By using its geoeconomic might and the investment and trade ties it has built under its Belt and Road Initiative, China hopes to achieve this goal^{ix}. As per one analyst, the widely publicized One Belt, One Road programme is an organized effort, in part, to build bigger markets for China extending beyond Eurasia, with infrastructure ties are stretching from south and central

Asia to Africa and Europe. Chinese interest in Eurasia is growing and will have substantial geopolitical implications. Concerns have been expressed by the Indian government that China is enclosing it with military-related construction projects. By transforming Eurasian continent into a rival and eventually surpassing Euro-Atlantic area, the Belt and Road programme aims to achieve its ultimate goal.^x The strategic conflict between India and China in the Indian Ocean region (IOR) is determined by a various factor, such as the ones that follow:

As part of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China is expanding its strategic engagement with Pakistan via the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and also advancing its diplomatic, trade and investment ties with Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal and Myanmar.

- Chinese military and naval involvement in the Indian Ocean region, including a latest military infrastructure in Djibouti (and maybe another in Pakistan) and greater naval activity in the Indian Ocean;^{xi}
- Over sovereignty issues pertaining to the CPEC project in Kashmir, India's refusal not to join China's BRI.
- The claim of China to the India's Arunachal Pradesh and the impasse between India and China at Doklam in Bhutan;
- In addition, China opposes India's entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and its inclusion in the United Nations Security Council^{xii};
- More than one million exiled Tibetans are currently living in India, including the Dalai Lama.
- Establishing ties with Vietnam; and Act East Policy of India;
- India's trade imbalance with China;
- In contrast to India, which is the world's largest democracy, China presents its authoritarian system as an example for the rest of the globe.

THE INDIAN OCEAN AND CHINA'S STRATEGY

There has been an increase in China's influence and engagement in the IOR. This presence now includes a military presence in addition to trade and business. According to regional observers, the speed and extent of China's aspirations to strengthen its strategic position in the region are still up in the air. China's military buildup in the IOR has been progressing much quicker. It involves the construction of a network of military and naval outposts along the Indian Ocean coastline, commencing with Djibouti and a new station that is expected to be constructed in Pakistan at or near Gwadar. Eastern Africa and the central or eastern Indian Ocean are possible locations for additional military bases of China. With a web of bases having various sizes and types, China's ability to respond to emergencies impacting its interests, such as, noncombatant evacuations, assistance for anti-piracy operations and security of Chinese citizens and assets, will be enhanced. China's strategy of "Far Sea Defense" is an expansion of its previous naval strategic plan, which was centered on China's coastal regions as well as Taiwan. As China's economic might grows, so does its ability to protect its maritime interests, which are of essential importance to the country's overall prosperity. ^{xiii}

Premier Li Keqiang has stated that the national security of China is undergoing profound changes and as a result, the country must continue to bolster its naval and air defence abilities. Chinese navy modernizations aims to protect its Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC), especially ones connecting Gulf of Persia to China and also establish China's standing as a key regional and important global force among other objectives ^{xiv}.

In 2009, International anti-piracy activities in the IOR were carried out by the Chinese navy ^{xv} ^{xvi}. This has helped Chinese navy to enhance its long-range abilities. Report to Congress from the Defense secretary on Military and Security Developments regarding the PRC, published yearly, Chinese foreign policy in 2017 is described in the following way:

Since China's geopolitical presence and global ambitions has expanded, its military modernization programme shifted to support tasks outside China's borders, such as projecting power and maritime safety.... There's a good chance that China will look to expand its military presence in countries with which it has existing cordial relations ^{xvii}.

In addition, it was noted in the 2017 report that the PLA has expanded its reach well beyond China's territory and nearby area as a result of China's increased maritime focus on operations protecting its overseas interests. PLAN's shift from "offshore waters defense" to "offshore waters defense" and "far seas protection" demonstrates an increasing interest by top leadership in an expanded operational reach ^{xviii}.

INDIA'S POSITION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION

Throughout most of its history, India has been focusing on incursions along its northwestern border and land power. In addition to their land borders, India and China are also focusing on their marine security environments, which represent a major shift in their strategic posture. States around the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) including the US and other nations having substantial regional interests is visibly affected by India and China's maritime competition ^{xix}. Changing India's foreign outlook from strategic autonomy and non-alignment to a greater focus on forging strategic relationships with USA, Japan and several others, may help India to rise as a significant power in the Indo-Pacific and South Asia. When Sushma Swaraj the then External Affairs Minister called on India to "Act East" in 2014, it highlighted India's desire to play an important role beyond the Indian Ocean and South Asia ^{xx}.

In past couple of years, India has engaged itself in a variety of efforts that might assist to challenge China's growing sphere of Influence in the Indian Ocean region as well South Asia. The Act East policy of India plans to establish its very own trade route to Central Asia via Chahabar in Iran, the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) between the United States, Australia and Japan are examples of such endeavors.

A major shift in Look East policy of India, which had been in existence since the 1990s, was made at the East Asia Summit of 2014 by Prime Minister Modi, who renamed it as Act East policy. The Act East policy of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is economic as well as strategic in nature, thus including:

- Opposing China's growing power in the Indian Ocean and Southern Asia, as a strategic goal
- Promoting India's exports and improve the northeastern region, as an economic goal.

India is looking to strengthen trade route links with Southeast Asia using infrastructural projects that join India with Southeast Asia via Burma. Trilateral highway between India, Thailand, and Myanmar and also the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transport project are two significant endeavors^{xxi}. To enhance its maritime capacity, India has further launched a plan termed as Sagarmala, which intends to double the country's current major ports^{xxii}. Additionally, India has taken a variety of activities outside of its boundaries in an effort to establish itself as a major player in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

NEXUS BETWEEN INDIA AND IRAN

The strategic cooperation between Iran and India is one such example. Iran's strategic position and closeness to the Strait of Hormuz makes it one of the world's most significant nations. It is estimated that 30% of the world's oil is transported through the Strait of Hormuz every single day. Many reasons have contributed to Iran's inability to take full advantage of these natural resources, including inadequate facilities and Western sanctions. A strategic partnership between India and Iran has been formed, and the first portion of the Chabahar port has been completed in Iran. The port is located closer to the oil fields of Farzad, which adds to India's advantage. India can potentially get access to Central Asia via Chabahar port, although that is mainly reliant on Afghanistan's stability^{xxiii}.

Indian has secured a waiver from US sanctions imposed on Iran, which is relevant to this discussion. Both countries are closely linked, and this illustrates how India's investments are well-protected in the region. India, with its foothold in Iran, can closely check the transit of Chinese ships and also create undue delays to shipments besides the oil trade which runs through the Strait of Hormuz. In order to accomplish this, India will need to deploy its naval forces in the region. As a precaution, India has overtaken Duqm port of Oman in order to provide logistical and maintenance aid to its warships, which are currently stationed in the region. The Red Sea and also the Gulf of Aden can both be accessed by India via the port of

Duqm. During the recent trilateral meeting between Iran, India and Uzbekistan discussions were made about the shared use of the Chabahar port on the Gulf of Oman and also about the ways to improve the transportation and transit route.

EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES AND INDIA

India's strategic relationship with Indonesia has allowed it to expand its reach across Eastern Asia as well as Western Asia. The Malacca Straits, an extremely prominent bottleneck point, is likewise overlooked by Indonesia, like Iran. With Indonesia, India has struck a deal to capture the Sabang port, a key port. India as well as Indonesia has denied being a part of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). By the assistance of India, Indonesia can counter China's growing influence in the area by using its position as a maritime fulcrum. Both these moves will allow India to have a close watch on China since it might delay vessels both at the beginning and closure of their journeys^{xxiv}.

INDIA AND AFRICA'S PARTNERSHIP

India has begun to work on the Indian Oceans African rim as part of its efforts to protect the entrances and exits. In 2017, India and Japan unveiled the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor as a joint initiative (AAGC). It is already being referred to as a substitute of the BRI by the media of Japan as well as India. The Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) in Jakarta, the International Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS), located in India, and the Institute of Developing Economies-Japan External Trade Organization are the think tanks behind this strategic plan^{xxv}. An estimated 40 billion US dollars will be spent on the AAGC, which is expected to help African countries build infrastructure and human capital^{xxvi}.

This endeavor is an intentional and clear move to undercut China's involvement in the region. There is still a vast unexplored market in Africa, and the AAGC intends to be one of the first to connect Africa with Japan and India via alternate routes and superior infrastructure. African

natural resources, such as uranium, might provide both India and Japan's nuclear power demands. Another benefit of making a financial investment in Africa is the fact that the continent has a significant importance for the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) If India ends up winning over Africa; it might become a major player in the United Nations General Assembly, which has 54 members. The AAGC will also provide India with an opportunity to expand its military presence in Africa to protect its investments and stop piracy in and around Bab el Mandeb.

During negotiations with Seychelles, India also tried to take control of the two of the country's islands in the name of a policy called Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) ^{xxvii}. It was only recently that the deal collapsed after the internet exposed disturbing details about the pact ^{xxviii}. Although, India has a monitoring station in Madagascar in its close proximity. The radars installed in Madagascar are among the first of their kind for India and serve as an advanced surveillance system, keeping Indians informed about nautical traffic off the coast of Africa ^{xxix}. According to certain reports, India also has a listening post in Oman. However, despite no evidence from open source, it is possible that one post might exist. Pakistani Navy's movements and communications can be easily tracked if this is true ^{xxx}. While India is flaunting its might in the Indian Ocean, it also looks to be attempting to seize control of the IOR. India's ambition of becoming a regional power includes the goal of becoming a blue sea navy.

CONFLICTING INTERESTS

Using the notion of “nested security dilemma” will be helpful in demonstrating India's and China's response to each other's actions and its impact beyond their bilateral relationships, with implications for the wider regional security dynamic. Nested security dilemma is based on the assumption that security dilemmas between major states have repercussions for regional and global security transcending their bilateral relations ^{xxxi}.

There has been a rise in the discussion over Indo-China naval competition in recent years. Naval researcher Toshi Yoshihara points out that since India and China move seaward,

both nations will battle for dominance and power across the whole Indo-Pacific maritime theatre ^{xxxii}.

India and China's maritime capabilities have grown and their naval ambitions have broadened in recent years, resulting in a security dilemma that has manifested itself so far only in the territory of inner Asia says India's strategic expert C. Raja Mohan. As a result, the bilateral relation between the two Asian countries has begun to develop a competitive dynamic encompassing the whole Indo-Pacific littoral ^{xxxiii}.

Perkovich agrees with this sentiment, pointing out that both India and China are expanding their abilities to project power and safeguard their communication lines in increasingly isolated waters (such that), China will look for encroaching upon India's area of interest in the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal whereas India might be misplaced in the 'Southern China Sea and the Strait of Malacca.' China's Maritime Silk Road (MSR) idea has raised concerns in India over China's rising involvement in the Indian Ocean ^{xxxiv}. The MSR, which President Xi Jinping proposed in 2013 while on a trip to Southeast Asia, has been expanded to the IOR, and several states in the region have endorsed its implementation (Ibid.; ^{xxxv}.

Chinese ambitions in the Indian Ocean go beyond securing maritime trade networks; they are based on deep-sea mining concessions of China in the southern Indian Ocean ^{xxxvi}.

International relations expert John Garver says that Beijing is seeking to establish a new status quo in the Indian Ocean by gradually increasing its naval presence ^{xxxvii}.

As a result of these improvements, India has improved its anti-submarine capabilities, as seen by the introduction of the first indigenously manufactured INS Kamorta guided-missile warship in August of 2014 ^{xxxviii}.

Furthermore, the China- India maritime competition is becoming immensely onshore, as seen by the establishment of transshipment hubs along maritime trade routes. Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Gwadar in Pakistan are two examples of China's 'String of Pearls' plan, which it has rebranded as the more benevolent MSR ^{xxxix}.

In response to China's 'String of Pearls,' India has come up with its own 'Necklace of Diamonds' ^{xi}. Considering their historical resistance to foreign bases, both countries seem to be more inclined to adopt a policy of "places, not bases" with arrangements instead of establishing permanent bases in other countries, to obtain privileged access to services there ^{xii}.

CONVERGENCE OF INTERESTS

As part of the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction process, both governments have synchronized their anti-piracy patrolling in the Indian Ocean. There is no longer a difference between the China's and India's presence in the waters of eastern Malacca and western Malacca anymore, according to India's former national security adviser Shivshankar Menon. Both have occurred at the same time and seem to have had no impact on one another ^{xiii}.

The nature of maritime security is not solely competitive, as indicated by the recent development of a maritime bilateral security dialogue between India and China ^{xliii}. In Beijing, the 2nd Indo-China maritime security dialogue took place, during which both countries shared views on issues of mutual concern, particularly maritime security, the blue economy, and measures to further strengthen pragmatic cooperation. The key highlights of the dialogue were.

- Each party stressed the importance of expanding Sino- India relations by strengthening marine cooperation.
- Increase mutual strategic and political trust between the two countries. (*India-China Maritime Affairs Dialogue*, 2018).

A NAVAL COMPARISON OF CHINA AND INDIA

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) conducted a recent study that clearly reveals that China's military capability is far greater than India's ^{xliv}. Because of this, India has decided to build modest stations throughout the IOR, whilst China has focused on acquiring

the most important locations. China has 141 navy boats, while India has just 43 of them. This is only a fraction of China's arsenal (Ibid.).

India does not want to get involved in a military conflict with China, but it is strongly supported by the United States. In spite of this, even the United States would dissuade a direct conflict between the two countries. The United States, on the other hand, plans to have a number of alliances with India to empower it. As a result of this policy, the United States has announced that India will play a central role in its Indo-Pacific strategy. The new Indo-Pacific policy, which is built on the principle of freedom and openness, makes no mention of how the parties involved want to preserve it that way. It is a long-term goal of this policy to draw India into the Indo-Pacific security landscape. India's position in the American policy on the Indo-Pacific is evident, and this indicates that the Quad, which includes the American allies, is being revived. Strategic Survey 2020: The Annual Assessment of Geopolitics, predicts that even after the pandemic has passed, China's growing assertiveness and Indo- Pakistan rivalry would continue to shape the regional security landscape. It stated

Competition intensified in the region. Beijing seemed steadily more intent on asserting strategic primacy in its maritime littoral. The US government...saw evidence that China was taking advantage of other governments' preoccupation with the Covid-19 pandemic to gain strategic advantage throughout what the US, its allies and other states including India and Indonesia increasingly referred to as the Indo-Pacific region. ^{xlv}

It was stated in a paper published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) that this Covid-19 pandemic had "major" geopolitical repercussions, and also China took advantage of this for strategic benefits in the Indo-Pacific area (Ibid.).

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

For a long time, Indian strategists have been apprehensive about China's construction of a web of ports and listening posts of late known as the 'string of pearls' across the shores of Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar etc. coasts has been a matter of great concern for India. The Indian

media has consistently reported on small Chinese naval flotillas traversing the waters of Indian Ocean usually undeclared, and they often comprise of destroyers and warships that have recently been present in the Gulf of Aden as a part of international antipiracy operations. A Chinese espionage ship camouflaged as a fisherman's trawler was identified by the Indian Navy in the beginning of 2011, and the Indian Navy tracked it but was unable to act immediately because it had reached international waters^{xlvi}. If nothing else, these missions show China's naval capability for long-range deployments which are necessary for its upcoming maritime activities in the Indian Ocean littoral and the high seas. In 2011, a Chinese captain's proposal that China should develop a naval station in the Gulf of Aden sparked concerns across the region that a clash between India and China was brewing along the crucial energy exports lines or towards the north of the Indian Ocean. However, despite Beijing's efforts to downplay the significance of this, China remains a significant economic threat to India, given India's increasing reliance on oil in the Persian Gulf and United States preoccupation of the region as other sources of global oil supply start to dry up in future. India, as it appears, tends to avoid being aligned with major powers and will be unable to be a part of any multi - polar order based on power. While Sino-India potential rivalry has been widely discussed in strategic circles, their respective navies are projected to be their principal means to make power projection in determining the future of Asian security.

Despite its calm appearance, the Indian Ocean is a geopolitical hotspot that could host a number of future wars. A new strategy of the US in the Indo-Pacific region is prompting China and India to follow suit. On one hand, China, intends to be a major power with military and economic dominance, while India has made it apparent that it aspires to be a regional hegemon. Strategic assets across the oceans have been seized by both India and China, and they plan to use them to regulate future moves.

REFERENCES

Association of South East Asian Nations, ASEAN. “About ASEAN,” n.d.

International Institute of Strategic Studies, IISS. “Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment,” 2016.

Basu, Titli. “Thinking Africa: India, Japan and the Asia Africa Growth Corridor.” *Diplomat*, June 3, 2017.

Bipindra, N. C. “India to Unveil Warship to Deter Chinese Submarines near Coast.” *mint*, 2014.

“China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report RL33153,” 2022. https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/2022-01-20_RL33153_9cdc996141e3efa4def1328e37888847428879af.pdf.

“China President Xi’s Visit: India to Hold Maritime Dialogue with China This Year.” *Economic Times*, September 18, 2014.

Chong, Byron. “Understanding Sino-Indian Relations – A Theoretical Perspective.” Center for International Maritime Security, 2016. <https://cimsec.org/understanding-sino-indian-relations-theoretical-perspective/>.

Erickson, Michael S. Chase and Andrew S. “Changes in Beijing’s Approach to Overseas Basing?” *China Brief* 9, no. 19 (2009).

Garver, John. “The Security Dilemma in Sino–Indian Relations.” *India Review* 1, no. 4 (2002): 33–44.

Gautam, P. K. “Mapping Chinese Oil and Gas Pipelines and Sea Routes.” *Strategic Analysis* 35, no. 4 (2011).

Gresh, Geoffrey F. “Chokepoints of the Western Indian Ocean, China’s Maritime Silk Route and the Future of Regional Security.” In *Eurasia’s Maritime Rise and Global Security*, edited by Geoffrey F. Gresh. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.

- Hassan, M. A. “Modi’s Maritime Ambitions – Implications for Pakistan.” Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, 2018.
- Herbert-Burns, Rupert. “Naval Power in the Indian Ocean: Evolving Roles, Missions and Capabilities.” In *Indian Ocean Rising: Maritime Security and Policy Challenges*, edited by David Michael and Russell Sticklor. Stimson, 2012.
- Heywood, Andrew. *Globalization of World Politics*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
- “India Activates First Listening Post on Foreign Soil: Radars in Madagascar.” *Indian Express*, July 18, 2007.
- AA Me, IN. “Indian Listening Station in Oman Monitoring Pakistan’s Naval Communications,” 2013.
- Jervis, Robert. “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma.” *World Politics* 30, no. 2 (1978): 167–214.
- Manthan, Raja Mohan and Samudra. “Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012.
- Mearshiemer, John. “Realism, the Real World and the Academy.” In *Realism and Institutionalism in International Studies*, edited by M. Brecher and F. Harvey. Ann Argot: The University of Michigan Press, 2002.
- Mehmud, Majid. “Growing Indonesia India Strategic Ties.” Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, 2018.
- Menon, Shivshankar. “India’s NSA on Sino–Indian Rivalry in the Indo–Pacific.” Observer Research Foundation, 2013.
- “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017, Annual Report to Congress,” 2017.
- Mohan, C. Raja. *Samudra Manthan - Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2012.
- Nair, Avinash. “To Counter China, India Pushes East.” *Stratfor*, November 10, 2017.

- Nouwens, Meia. "China and India: Competition for Indian Ocean Dominance?" International Institute for Strategic Studies, IISS, 2018.
- Panda, Jagannath. "The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor: An India-Japan Arch in the Making?" *Focus Asia* 21, no. August (2017).
- Patranobis, S. "Day After Blocking UN Move Against Masood Azhar, China Says Will Promote Ties with 'Important Neighbour' India." *Hindustan Times*, November 3, 2017.
- Peiris, Nuwan. "China, India in Race to Exploit Indian Ocean Seabed." *Sunday Times (Sri Lanka)*, December 15, 2013.
- Rachman, Gideon. "An Assertive China Challenges the West." *Financial Times*, October 23, 2017.
- Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai. "A New China Military Base in Pakistan." *The Diplomat*, 2018.
- Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, Government of India. "Sagarmala: Concept and Objectives," n.d.
- Sen, S. R. "China Ship with 22 Labs Spied on India." NDTV, 2011.
- "Seychelles Won't Move Forward on Naval Project with India: President Danny Faure." *Times of India*, June 17, 2018.
- Sonwalkar, Prasun. "China Used Covid-19 for Strategic Gains in Indo-Pacific." *Hindustan Times*, December 25, 2021.
- Swaraj, Sushma. "SAGAR — India's Vision for the Indian Ocean Region." India Foundation, 2017. <https://indiafoundation.in/articles-and-commentaries/sagar-indias-vision-for-the-indian-ocean-region/>.
- "Time to Change 'Look East' to Act East Policy." *Press Trust of India*, August 25, 2014.
- Tellis, Ashley. "India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005.
- Tiezi, Shannon. "China Pushes 'Maritime Silk Road' in South, Southeast Asia." *The Diplomat*, September 17, 2014.

- Upadhyaya, S. “Expansion of Chinese Maritime Power in the Indian Ocean: Implications for India.” *Defence Studies* 17, no. January (2017).
- Wong, Edward. “Chinese Military Seeks to Extend Its Naval Power.” *The Newyork Times*, April 23, 2010.
- Xinhua. “Chronology of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.” People’s Daily Online, 2016. <http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0624/c90883-9077342.html>.
- Yoshihara, Toshi. “The US Navy’s Indo-Pacific Challenge.” *Journal of the Indian Ocean* 9, no. 1 (2013).
- Yunbi, Wu Jiao and Zhang. “Xi in Call for Building of New ‘Maritime Silk Road.’” *China Daily*, October 4, 2013.

ENDNOTES

- ⁱ John Mearshiemer, “Realism, the Real World and the Academy,” in *Realism and Institutionalism in International Studies*, ed. M. Brecher and F. Harvey (Ann Argot: The University of Michigan Press, 2002), 23–33.
- ⁱⁱ Andrew Heywood, *Globalization of World Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 229–30.
- ⁱⁱⁱ Byron Chong, “Understanding Sino-Indian Relations – A Theoretical Perspective,” Center for International Maritime Security, 2016, <https://cimsec.org/understanding-sino-indian-relations-theoretical-perspective/>.
- ^{iv} Geoffrey F. Gresh, “Chokepoints of the Western Indian Ocean, China’s Maritime Silk Route and the Future of Regional Security,” in *Eurasia’s Maritime Rise and Global Security*, ed. Geoffrey F. Gresh (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 31–48.
- ^v P. K. Gautam, “Mapping Chinese Oil and Gas Pipelines and Sea Routes,” *Strategic Analysis* 35, no. 4 (2011): 595–612.
- ^{vi}, n.d.)
- ^{vii} “Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment,” International Institute of Strategic Studies, IISS, 2016.
- ^{viii} Ashley Tellis, “India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005.
- ^{ix} Xinhua, “Chronology of China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” People’s Daily Online, 2016, <http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0624/c90883-9077342.html>.
- ^x Gideon Rachman, “An Assertive China Challenges the West,” *Financial Times*, October 23, 2017.
- ^{xi} Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “A New China Military Base in Pakistan,” *The Diplomat*, 2018.
- ^{xii} S. Patranobis, “Day After Blocking UN Move Against Masood Azhar, China Says Will Promote Ties with ‘Important Neighbour’ India,” *Hindustan Times*, November 3, 2017.
- ^{xiii} Edward Wong, “Chinese Military Seeks to Extend Its Naval Power,” *The Newyork Times*, April 23, 2010.
- ^{xiv} (CRS Report RL33153, 2022)
- ^{xv} (Upadhyaya, 2017;
- ^{xvi} Herbert-Burns, 2012)
- ^{xvii} “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017, Annual Report to Congress,” 2017.
- ^{xviii} (Ibid.)

- ^{xix} C. Raja Mohan, *Samudra Manthan - Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2012).
- ^{xx} Sushma Swaraj, "Time to Change 'Look East' to Act East Policy," *Press Trust of India*, August 25, 2014.
- ^{xxi} Avinash Nair, "To Counter China, India Pushes East," *Stratfor*, November 10, 2017.
- ^{xxii} "Sagarmala: Concept and Objectives," Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, Government of India, n.d.
- ^{xxiii} M. A. Hassan, "Modi's Maritime Ambitions – Implications for Pakistan," Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, 2018.
- ^{xxiv} Majid Mehmud, "Growing Indonesia India Strategic Ties," Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, 2018.
- ^{xxv} Jagannath Panda, "The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor: An India-Japan Arch in the Making?," *Focus Asia* 21, no. August (2017).
- ^{xxvi} Titli Basu, "Thinking Africa: India, Japan and the Asia Africa Growth Corridor," *Diplomat*, June 3, 2017.
- ^{xxvii} Sushma Swaraj, "SAGAR – India's Vision for the Indian Ocean Region," India Foundation, 2017, <https://indiafoundation.in/articles-and-commentaries/sagar-indias-vision-for-the-indian-ocean-region/>.
- ^{xxviii} (President Danny Faure, Times of India, 2018)
- ^{xxix} "India Activates First Listening Post on Foreign Soil: Radars in Madagascar," *Indian Express*, July 18, 2007.
- ^{xxx} "Indian Listening Station in Oman Monitoring Pakistan's Naval Communications," AA Me, IN, 2013.
- ^{xxxi} Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30, no. 2 (1978): 167–214.
- ^{xxxii} Toshi Yoshihara, "The US Navy's Indo-Pacific Challenge," *Journal of the Indian Ocean* 9, no. 1 (2013): 92.
- ^{xxxiii} Mohan, *Samudra Manthan - Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific*, 9.
- ^{xxxiv} Shannon Tiezi, "China Pushes 'Maritime Silk Road' in South, Southeast Asia," *The Diplomat*, September 17, 2014.
- ^{xxxv} (Jiao and Yunbi, 2013)
- ^{xxxvi} Nuwan Peiris, "China, India in Race to Exploit Indian Ocean Seabed," *Sunday Times (Sri Lanka)*, December 15, 2013.
- ^{xxxvii} John Garver, "The Security Dilemma in Sino-Indian Relations," *India Review* 1, no. 4 (2002): 33–34.
- ^{xxxviii} N. C. Bipindra, "India to Unveil Warship to Deter Chinese Submarines near Coast," *mint*, 2014, 34.
- ^{xxxix} Bipindra, "India to Unveil Warship to Deter Chinese Submarines near Coast."
- ^{xl} Raja Mohan and Samudra Manthan, "Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012, 135.
- ^{xli} (Chase and Erickson, 2009)
- ^{xlii} Shivshankar Menon, "India's NSA on Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific," Observer Research Foundation, 2013.
- ^{xliii} "China President Xi's Visit: India to Hold Maritime Dialogue with China This Year," *Economic Times*, September 18, 2014.
- ^{xliv} Meia Nouwens, "China and India: Competition for Indian Ocean Dominance?," International Institute for Strategic Studies, IISS, 2018.
- ^{xlv} Prasun Sonwalkar, "China Used Covid-19 for Strategic Gains in Indo-Pacific," *Hindustan Times*, December 25, 2021.
- ^{xlvi} S. R. Sen, "China Ship with 22 Labs Spied on India," NDTV, 2011.